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DOES PUBLIC SEX MATTER?

KATHeRINE Franke

1

Public Sex, SameSex Marriage,
and the Afterlife of
Homophobia
Consider two events that
dominated the news in the
summer of 2011: Anthony Weiner
resigned from Congress after it
became public that he had been
tweeting to some of his female
Twitter followers photos of himself
in various stages of undress, and
New York State became the largest
and most significant state in the
U.S. to grant same-sex couples
the right to marry. Two iconic
images captured this juxtaposition: a thumbnail of Weiner’s
bulging briefs and wedding cakes
topped with same-sex couples.
While these two events may
bear no strict causal relation to
one another, they are meaningfully
related synchronically. How so?
The panic that unfolded upon
the revelation of Representative
Weiner’s taste for a kind of public
sexuality that Twitter enabled
was fueled in important respects
by something I’ll call the afterlife

of homophobia; an afterlife that
appeared in the wake of the success of same-sex couples’ demand
for marriage equality rights. The
summer of 2011 marked an important turning-point in the geography
and politics of sex: public sex,
previously a domain dominated by
the specter of a hypersexualized
gay man, became the province of
the irresponsible, foolish, and selfdestructive heterosexual man, such
as Anthony Weiner. Meanwhile,
homosexuals were busy domesticating their sexuality in the
private domain of the family. Just as
hetero-sex shamefully seeped out
into the open, homo-sex disappeared from view into the dignified
pickets of private kinship. While
Anthony Weiner was exploring—at
his peril—new sexual publics that
social media made possible, samesex couples celebrated their official, legal inclusion in the domain
of the traditional, sexual private.
The twin projects of privatization and legitimization of
homosexuality began, of course,
with Justice Anthony Kennedy in
his 2003 opinion in Lawrence v.

Texas, in which he put an end to
the identity of the homosexual
as the sodomite by refiguring the
homosexual in homosocial terms.
As I have written elsewhere:
With respect to the right to make
decisions about intimate affiliations in private settings, Justice
Kennedy notes that “[p]ersons in
a homosexual relationship may
seek autonomy for these purposes,
just as heterosexual persons do,”
and that the statutes at issue in
Lawrence and in Bowers “seek to
control a personal relationship
that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is
within the liberty of persons to
choose without being punished as
criminals.” Note that the analogy here is between persons in
a homosexual relationship and
heterosexual persons. Thus, the
issue in Lawrence, as well as in
Bowers, was not the right to engage
in certain sexual conduct—that,
says Kennedy, would be demeaning to John Lawrence and Tyron
Garner. They would be disgraced
just as a married couple would be
if the claim were made that “mar-
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Justice Kennedy’s finding in
Lawrence that the Texas sodomy
law violated a fundamental liberty
right was premised upon a story
he made up about Lawrence and
Gardner being in a relationship in
which their interactions allowed
them to elaborate their “concept
of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of
human life.” Dale Carpenter’s
work on the backstory of this
“relationship” tells a quite different
tale—but the truth of the matter is
really irrelevant.3 What is important
is that the Supreme Court was
willing to welcome lesbian and
gay people into the community of rights-bearing citizens not
because of the sex we have, but
rather because of the “enduring
personal bonds” we seek—bonds
that gain constitutional protection
for reasons that are not squarely
or even obliquely about sex.
This new emplotment of gay
life, one animated by characters
who are kin not hookups, whose
connection is romantic not sexual,
is taken up in the briefs in the
marriage equality cases. The

homosexual portrayed in these filings is the soccer mom, the partner
who is a good provider, the loving
father, the de-facto daughter-inlaw, and the fellow who attends
stamp-collecting conventions.
The legitimate homosexual is he
or she who is willing to keep quiet
about the sex part of homosexual.
In this sense, the space cleared
out by the vanquishing of sodomy
law’s homophobia is a space for
the desexualized gay subject who
longs for the stability and fidelity
of “enduring personal bonds.”
In the marriage cases, the
decent, loving, faithful gay character is met by adamant arguments
from the other side insisting that
marriage is essentially a procreative enterprise, and that since only
a man and a woman can procreate,
marriage can only be made up of
husbands and wives. In response
to this heterosexualization of marriage, the same-sex couples insist
that “we too have children, just not
the way you do.” It makes sense
for the plaintiffs in these cases
to insist that there are ways to
make babies that aren’t essentially
heterosexual, but the consequence
of this argument is that homo-sex
loses any political, legal, or social
significance. Marriage, it seems, is
where homo-sex goes to die. While
the path of the argument may not

have been one we initiated, lesbian
and gay advocates have been
complicit in the marginalization, if
not erasure, of homo-sex and other
forms of sex that are the excess
over reproduction. Of course the
female orgasm, contraception, and
abortion have a stake in this politics as well. But who, if not lesbian
and gay people, see themselves
as having an interest in carrying a
brief for sex? Sex for its own sake,
and as part of a politics of freedom.

DOES PUBLIC SEX MATTER?

riage is simply about the right to
have sexual intercourse.” Kennedy
writes that “[sexual conduct] can
be but one element in a personal
bond that is more enduring.” More
enduring than what? Than sex?2

How did we get to this curious
place, a place with a politics that
would be almost unimaginable
to the sexual freedom fighters of
Stonewall? Once here, should
lesbian and gay-rights activists care
about sex in public any longer?
Should we cede that terrain to
misfits such as Weiner while we
celebrate the legitimization of
same-sex love that marriage
rights afford, or do we maintain
a stake, or at least an interest,
in the notion of sexual publics?
Better yet, now that homo-sex
has become privatized is sex in
public only of interest to those
who define themselves as Queer?
The space evacuated by the
repeal of sodomy laws need not be
taken up immediately or entirely
by the domain of kinship and the
family—but there is a great risk that
it would be. This space could be
157
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one in which a kind of sexual legibility might emerge that is not private, does not entail property relations, is not matrimonial, does not
take the couple form, and is not
necessarily enduring. The terms
of its zoning would be beyond
marriage, kinship, or the family.
Although serious attachments
may form, they simply wouldn’t
be ones whose terms of legibility
are set out by the state. It is these
spaces that are most threatened
by homophobia’s afterlife.
In a time when homosexuality
has been heteronormativized (so
long as it conforms to the hygienic
rules of marriage) certain forms of
sex-based shame and perversion
have been rendered all the more
vulnerable to social and legal
stigma. Here we find the afterlife
of homophobia. Homophobia’s
work has shifted from buttressing
the criminalization of sodomy,
and from justifying the ongoing
exclusion of same-sex couples
from legal marriage, to imposing a kind of penalty on those
people, regardless of their sexual
orientation, who cannot or will
not organize their desires, their
attachments, and their values in a
way that echoes the model homocitizens recounted in the briefs
in the same sex marriage cases.
The desires these cases leave out

find themselves ostracized into a
domain of increasingly marginalized illegitimacy, if not degeneracy.
Now, as much as, or even more
than ever, these outlaws are
regarded by more conventional
members of the community as out
of step with the main current of
gay politics—and indeed they are
seen to pose a threat to that politics insofar as they undermine the
claims to decency, respectability,
and dignity that the plaintiffs in the
marriage cases claim entitle them
to the benefits of legal marriage.
So here’s where Public Sex can
be so crucial as a site for resisting
homophobia’s afterlife and for
imagining a kind of sexual citizenship that isn’t defined by and
through the redemptive pastorality
of marriage. It’s time sex pushed
back and resisted a hygienic
sexual politics that aims to cleanse
homosexuality of its raunchier
elaborations, and demanded a
legitimate presence in quasipublic spaces such as Twitter and
Facebook, along with the more
commonly understood public
space of the street, the bar, or the
bookstore. Since same-sex marriage advocates have surrendered
to, if not embraced, the heteronormativity of the private family, the
public sphere may be the last refuge for sexual liberty. In this sense,

Anthony Weiner may be more
of an ally in the cause to defend
sexual liberty than are lesbian and
gay rights advocates. The elaboration of sexual publics (and by this
I don’t mean weddings) and new
forms of Public Sex are essential as
counterweights that can challenge
the hegemony of the matrimonialized gay subject/gay couple.
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158

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1944627

